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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
JOINT ADVENTURES
By JAmES Mom'rr MuLLzN*
I.
This subject is entirely of modern origin. It does not
exist in England except as a topic in the law of Partner-
ship. Its best definition comes out of Harvard: "An
association of two or more persons to carry out a single
business enterprise for profit".1
Much of the discussion about joint adventures might
be termed nomenclatural; the authorities devote many
pages to classification of the cases deciding what are and
what are not Joint Adventures. It is in reality a branch
of the law of Partnership, from which it must be distin-
guished. Also, it is closely related to the subjects of
Principal and Agent, Vendor and Vendee, Joint Owners,
Borrower and Lender, Landlord and Tenant, Employer
and Employee, Bailor and Bailee, Author and Publisher,
and some others.2  This subject also includes some more
familiarly known descriptive phrases, such as Syndicates,
Pooling Agreements, Grubstakers and Share-croppers, in-
stances of which will be later cited.
The Maryland law of Joint Adventures is anomalous
because of two features; first, that all of the law of this
topic, declared as such, is in a few cases later to be dis-
cussed, in all of which it was decided that no case of a
joint adventure was before the Court.3 Second, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals has in some cases considered facts
and decided principles of Joint Adventure law without
mentioning this subject, except remotely in one instance."
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1899, Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1906, University of Maryland.
Note, A Partnership and a Joint Adventure Distinguished (1920) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 852. See also 30 Am. Jur. 675; 33 C. J. 840.
2As to what amounts to a joint adventure, see the following annota-
tions: 48 A. L. R. 1055, 63 A. L. R. 909, 138 A. L. R. 968. See also 33 C. J.
841-845.
8 Powers v. State, 178 Md.' 23, 11 A. (2d) 909 (1940) ; Atlas Realty Co.
v. Gault, 153 Md. 586, 139 A. 285 (1927) ; Brenner v. Plitt, 34 A. (2d) 853
(Md., 1943).
'Redue v. Hofferbert, 161 Md. 296, 157 A. 294 (1931).
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II.
THE EssEntIALs OF A PARTNERSHIP.
A Joint Adventure is sometimes defined as a partner-
ship for a single transaction. It is important, therefore,
to determine the constituent elements of a partnership;
but in the language of Hamlet: "Ay, there's the rub!"
There is a long list of Maryland decisions dealing with
many kinds of supposed partnership relations, but we have
found no apt phrase defining a partnership. In a leading
case, we are told that .one prominent author on partner-
ship law quotes 15 different definitions, and that a partner-
ship is difficult to define.'
Just as Hendrik Van Loon in his book on THE ARTS
defines genius as "perfection of technique, plus something
else,"6 so the Maryland Court of Appeals says that a part-
nership results from a participation in the profits "unless
there be other facts and circumstances which indicate
that some other relation existed".7 So we shall not pause
here to be exact about a definition of a general partner-
ship and we shall postpone discussing those "other facts
and circumstances" until we deal with joint adventures
created by implied contracts.
We do, however, cite here the principal Maryland de-
cisions on what constitutes a partnership, with some com-
ments on some particular instances. Some of these cases
could be regarded as Joint Adventures. There are three
leading cases in Maryland determining what a partnership
is.8 The last one considered the facts before it in the light
of the Uniform Partnership Law, adopted in Maryland as
Article 73A of the Code of Public General Laws.
In Douglas v. Safe Deposit Co.,9 the Court considered
whether or not the business of R. G. Dun and Co., con-
ducted as a "Massachusetts Trust" was a partnership. De-
cisions in other jurisdictions were cited holding it to be
8 Thillman v. Benton, 82 Md. 64, 33 A. 485 (1895).
'Page 13.
1 Ibid., 82 Md. 73.
'Rowland v. Long, 45 Md. 439 (1876); Thillman v. Benton, 82 Md. 64,
33 A. 485 (1895); Southern Can Co. v. Sayler, 152 Md. 303, 136 A. 624
(1927).
'159 Md. 81, 92-93, 150 A. 37 (1930).
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a partnership; but the Maryland Court refused to decide
the issue. In Bryant v. Fitzsimmons,10 a receivership and
an accounting were held proper in equity for a partner-
ship as to a racehorse. This situation might have been
regarded as a Joint Adventure, but there are no conse-
quences to follow making this distinction. Similarly, in
Bruns v. Spalding," an agreement by two persons to im-
prove a piece of real estate and to sell and divide the profits
was subjected to a bill in equity for discovery and account-
ing. In Tomlinson v. Dille, 2 farming on shares was held
not a partnership.13
In an early case, Benson v. Ketchum,1 4 Chief Judge
Le Grand makes the finest distinction the author has ever
seen in any adjudicated case. Here K. was seeking to
assert in a court of equity rights growing out of certain
transactions in guano to be secured from a South Amer-
ican island. Some of the facts in the case indicate a need
for some "good neighbor" salve. K. was to be paid for
services on a percentage basis in connection with which
he claimed the rights of a partner. In denying these rights,
the opinion recited: 1
"He was not to receive one-fourth of the net profits,
which would have made him a partner, but a sum of
money 'equal to the quarter part of the net profits',
which did not constitute him one. He was in nowise
liable for any losses or engagements of the concern".
While we do not question the soundness of the ultimate
conclusion, the author confesses difficulty in following
such weighty differences between being paid "one-fourth
of the net profits", and receiving "a sum of money equal
to the quarter part of the net profits". But in a later case,
Southern Can Co. v. Saylor,16 this idea has been extended.
1o 106 Md. 421, 67 A. 356 (1907).
1190 Md. 349, 45 A. 194 (1900).
12 147 Md. 161, 127 A. 746 (1925).
1 Other decisions, dealing with partnership cases, but calling for no
particular comment, are: Townsend v. Appel, 164 Md. 255, 164 A. 679
(1933); Abbott v. Hibbitts, 142 Md. 7, 119 A. 650 (1922); Morgart v.
Smouse, 112 Md. 615, 77 A. 137 (1910) ; and Porter v. Connolly, 112 Md. 250,
75 A .510 (1910).
"4 14 Md. 331 (1859).
Ibid., 14 Md. 355.
16152 Md. 303, 314, 136 A. 624 (1927).
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III.
SOME DIsTNcToNs BETWEEN A JOINT ADvENTURE
AND A PARTNERSHIP.
Regarding a joint adventure as a partnership for a
single transaction (which may, however, be extended over
a period of years), there are a number of distinctions
which logically follow their essential differences.
1. Suits at Law. A joint adventurer can sue a co-
adventurer at law but a partner cannot sue another part-
ner until their mutual accounts have been liquidated by
some kind of an accounting. In Berg v. Plitt,'17 a suit was
sustained at law by one member of what was in effect a
joint adventure, though not so designated by the Court.
The action was to recover balances owed by one member
to the other two participants. 8 In Morgart v. Smouse,19
it was held that partners could not sue each other at law.
On the same facts, a suit was later sustained in equity.20
2. Corporate Members of a Joint Adventure. It seems
to be definitely established by general authorities outside
of Maryland that a corporation may engage in a joint ad-
venture where the nature of the enterprise is within its
chartered powers, though it can not become a member of
a partnership.'
As an instance, we suggest that two local corporations,
such as a Street Railway Company and a Gas Company
might build, lease or operate a joint head office building,
but they could not form a partnership for the general
real estate business.
We are aware of no Maryland case which outlines the
principles just stated, but the author participated in a
case in which two corporations, more or less closely con-
17178 Md. 155, 13 A. (2d) 364 (1940).
18 See also, Guth v. Elliott, 158 Md. 243, 148 A. 216 (1930).
"I 103 Md. 463, 63 A. 1070 (1906).
20 112 Md. 615, 77 A. 137 (1910). See also Note, A Partnership and a
Joint Adventure Distinguished (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 852; Note, Joint
Adventure-Actions at Law for Share of Profits (1943) 41 Mich. L. Rev.
982; 30 Am. Jur. 707-8; 33 C. J. 866; 47 C. J. 802. But see Redue v. Hoffer-
bert, 161 Md. 296, 157 A. 294 (1931), discussed below, circa, n. 38.
21 13 Am. Jur. 831; 14A C. J. 291.
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nected, but incorporated in different states, were held liable
jointly for the cost of erecting a warehouse for them22
3. Insolvency of Joint Adventure. In a law review
essay another distinction is pointed out.2 8 Upon the in-
solvency of a partnership, firm creditors have priority
against firm property over obligations of the separate part-
ners. This should not be true in the case of a joint ad-
venture, for the reason assigned by the author of this note,
that no credit would be given to the joint debtors upon the
strength of the joint property.
4. Agency Questions. There are some marked differ-
ences here; they are discussed below under the head of
obligations of the joint adventure to third persons.
IV.
FIDUCIARY RELATIONS OF JoIT ADvENrrUpm.
Based upon the same fundamental affiliations as those
of a partnership, the relationship of the participants in
a joint adventure inter se, is fiduciary in character and
the utmost good faith is required. 4
In Hambleton v. Rhind, a member of a syndicate formed
to acquire and sell some South Carolina State bonds, was
required to account to the syndicate for some profits he
had made through a private transaction. Judge McSherry,
who wrote the opinion said: 25
"Scrupulous good faith is naturally, if not neces-
sarily, implied from the very nature and character of
the relation of partnership; and consequently intrigues
by one member for a private benefit to himself are
clearly offenses against the partnership at large, and
as such are relievable in a Court of Equity".
In Meinhard v. Salmon, the New York Court of Appeals
held a member of 4 joint adventure to the responsibility
of a trustee. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court, then
22 Iron Clad Co. v. Stanfield, 112 Md. 360, 76 A. 854 (1910).
21 Note, A Partnership and a Joint Adventure Distinguished (1920) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 852, 854.
21 Hambleton v. Rhind, 84 Md. 456, 36 A. 597 (1896), and 86 Md. 305, 38
A. 40 (1897). See generally, on the duties of a fiduciary, Clapp, A Fidu-
ciary's Duty of Loyalty (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 221.
25 84 Md. 456, 487.
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Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, outlined
the ethical duties of such a fiduciary in pungent phrases,
which are usually quoted in every case in which a trustee
fails in his .duty. Said he:
"Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden
to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held
to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
As to this there has developed a tradition that is un-
bending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has
been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned
to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. Only
thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept
at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It
will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of
this court".26
V.
COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF
JOINT ADVENTURES.
1. Commencement. Joint adventures must always
start with some form of contract. They do not arise by
operation of law.2 7 Much of the law of the commehce-
ment of joint adventures is merely the application of con-
tract principles to the particular circumstances involved.
For instance, the contract creating the joint adventure may
be challenged on the ground of being contrary to public
policy; if there is no invalidity, the contract will of course
be enforced.28
In Guth v. Elliott, 9 one member of a syndicate to dis-
tribute corporate stock sued at law for his share of the
profits. The question there involved was whether or not
he was a member of the syndicate. A judgment for the
plaintiff was sustained on appeal.
go Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545, 62 A. L. R. 1 (1928);
15 R. C. L. 501; 33 C. J. 851.
27 See 30 Am. Jur. 681, to the effect that the contract may either be ex-
press or inferred from the facts and circumstances. See also 33 C. J. 847,
and Powers v. State, 178 Md. 23, 11 A. (2d) 909 (1940).
11 Berg v. Plitt, 178 Md. 155, 12 A. (2d) 609 (1940).
29 158 Md. 243, 148 A. 216 (1930).
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There is nothing in the law of this subject which pro-
vides that contracts creating joint adventures must be in
writing per se.30 And while there is nothing to require
a contract for a joint adventure, as such, to be in writing,
we can conceive of some forms of undertaking, which can-
not be performed within a year, and hence are within the
Statute of Frauds.
2. Termination. The nature of the agreement creat-
ing the joint adventure will, of course, control the term
of its existence. While an essential feature of a joint
adventure is that it pertains to a single transaction, there
is nothing that limits its duration to any particular period.
Some of them may run for many years.
So, in most cases, the completion of the enterprise
contracted for will end the joint relations of the partici-
pants. Other things, of course, may terminate the enter-
prise; and then the court may be called upon to decide the
rights of the parties which are changed by such circum-
stances.
In Cover v. Taliaferro,3 ' three persons executed a con-
tract to make and exploit machinery, and to form a cor-
poration to manufacture and sell the machinery. Here
a suit was brought in equity by one member to declare
a forfeiture of the rights of the other two on the ground
that they had defaulted in their performances. The equi-
table doctrines of forfeitures were considered. A decree
for the defendants was affirmed on appeal.
In a law review note there is some interesting comment
on a situation in which a joint adventure to sell cotton
to Austrians was abruptly terminated by the First World
War, and the Trading with the Enemy Act. The defend-
ants sold the cotton to the Spaniards at a profit. The
Supreme Court held that the joint adventure was termin-
ated by the War and the plaintiff was not entitled to
any of the profits.3 2
30 Berg v. Plitt, 178 Md. 155, 12 A. (2d) 609 (1940) ; 33 C. J. 848.
31142 Md. 586, 122 A. 2 (1923).
32 Note, Joint Adventures-Division of Profits as Result of Impossibility
of Accomplishment (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 773. Other situations in which
joint adventures have been terminated by unexpected events will be found
discussed in 33 C. J. 848.
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VI.
CLASSIFICATION OF JOINT ADVENTURES.
As we have seen above, all joint adventures have their
origins in some form of agreement, but many of the cases
decided by courts outside of Maryland seem to justify a
classification of joint adventures into topics comparable
to those into which cases of subrogation are divided, Con-
ventional, created by agreement, and Legal, arising by op-
eration of law."
Under the accepted law of joint adventures, such a
classification is not possible. We believe, however, that
if we class them as created by express and implied con-
tracts, the same results will be accomplished; and all the
legal fictions of the settled law of joint adventures will
be respected.
VII.
JOINT ADvENTuE CEATED BY ExPRis CONTRACTS.
It is obvious that a joint adventure created by an ex-
press contract in which all the rights of the parties have
been clearly stipulated, creates no problem, or at least
none that is not solved by the ordinary laws of contract.
As instances, several Maryland cases might here be cited."
The cases just cited call for no special comment, except
that in the opinions deciding the rights of the parties, they
are not classed as joint adventures. There are some other
decisions which present facts which indubitably are joint
adventures. The two cases to which special attention is
directed are cases involving "syndicate agreements".3 5
In Hambleton v. Rhind, 6 the Court was called upon
to enforce rights of the syndicate members against one
of them who tried to make a secret profit on the side.
38 See Mullen, The Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation (1939) 3 Md. L.
Rev. 201.
"I Berg v. Plitt, 178 Md. 155, 12 A. (2d) 609 (1940) ; Kahn v. Schleisner,
165 Md. 106, 166 A. 435 (1933); Peoples v. Ault, 128 Md. 401, 97 A. 711
(1916) ; and Larkin v. Maclellan, 140 Md. 570, 118 A. 181 (1922).
11 Hambleton v. Rhind, 84 Md. 456, 36 A. 597 (1896) ; Bedue v. Hoffer-
bert, 161 Md. 296, 157 A. 294 (1931).
88 Ibid.
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These gains were held a part of the syndicate assets; that
particular member could not retain them. Judge McSherry
said, in defining the agreement sued on:3 7
"Now, a syndicate, according to the undisputed evi-
dence, is an association of individuals, formed for the
purpose of conducting and carrying out some partic-
ular business transaction, ordinarily of a financial
character, in which the members are mutually inter-
ested. It is as respects the persons composing it, a
partnership, and in so far as these same persons are
concerned the legal obligations assumed by them are,
as between themselves, substantially the same as those
which the law imposes on the members of an ordinary
copartnership".
In Redue v. Hofferbert,88 eight persons entered into a
syndicate pertaining to an issuance of capital stock of a
bank. The successive transactions were complicated and
a loss resulted. Five members paid up; three refused. The
Court described the transaction: 3 9
"The association, which the members formed, was
a joint undertaking for their common benefit, although
some of their obligations were, in form, made several.
It was an enterprise in which the associates assumed
the chance of profit or of loss. In the event the shares
of stock were sold at a loss, the ultimate amount of
liability of a member, who would be able to pay as
bound, depended, not only upon his obligation to pay
as principal, but also upon his obligation as a surety
for such others of the syndicate who might fail to ful-
fill their obligations because of insolvency or inability
to pay".
The action was brought in equity by the syndicate
trustee and the five members who paid up, against the
three in default. The Court held equity had jurisdiction: 0
"The situation, therefore, was not where an action
lay for the undisputed balance of an account or as a
result of an account stated, nor could the plaintiffs
37 Ibid., 84 Md. 465.
as 161 Md. 296, 157 A. 294 (1931).
so Ibid., 161 Md. 301.
40 Ibid., 302.
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bring an action at law on the theory of contribution,
because the plaintiffs had not made any payment as
sureties of a debt of the defendants nor as jointly
liable with them ex contractu. 1 Poe, Pl. & Pr., secs.
113, 114, and Williston on Contracts, secs. 1278, 1277,
345. The affairs of the syndicate have, however,
reached a juncture where it becomes necessary to dis-
cover the solvency and ability of every one of the three
defendants to pay in whole or in part. Not only does
the final amount of the liability of the obligors as
principals and sureties for one another depend upon
the undetermined question of the solvency or ability
of one, two or three of the defendants, but also upon
the solvency and ability of the other obligors, who
are plaintiffs, to pay the additional sums for which
they would be bound as sureties in the event of the
insolvency or inability of one or more of the defendants
to pay the obligations of a principal or surety."
There are other forms of such joint adventures, created
by express contracts, among which might be mentioned
Pooling Agreements, Farming on Shares and some others
appearing in partnership cases referred to above. Also,
we would regard the usual type of Lloyds Insurance con-
tracts as coming in this category. Such contracts are spe-
cifically authorized by Maryland statutory law for all kinds
of insurance except life, health and accident.41 And, too,
many Maryland citizens discovered in 1941 that the auto-
mobile liability insurance policies issued by Reciprocal Ex-
changes and Inter-insurers entailed some partnership re-
sponsibilities.42
VIII.
JoINT ADVENTURES CREATED BY IMPLIED CONTRACTS.
It is in this class of cases that real difficulties arise.
Here we have for adjudication situations in which two
or more persons initiate a joint enterprise with some form
of contract, express or implied, but in which they fail
to make any stipulation as to their rights in important
41 Md. Code (1939) Art. 48A, Sec. 81.
" Md. Code (1939) Art. 48A, Sees. 135-145; Taggart v. Wachter, 179 Md.
608, 21 A. (2d) 141 (1941).
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particulars. Such cases may arise in states of fact involv-
ing both contract and tort liability. In a later topic, we
shall discuss the rights of members of such joint enter-
prises, as well as those of third persons. But, first, we
desire to isolate and identify the particular species, which
we call joint adventures created by implied contracts.
In these cases, the issues presented are mixed questions
of law and fact; and it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to outline a formula which will cover the situation ade-
quately. It is also impossible to be dogmatic on this score
in Maryland, because, in several cases, our Court of Ap-
peals has indulged in some general views as to what con-
stitutes joint adventures in such cases, but it has in no
instance adjudicated any such state of facts as a joint
adventure.
We therefore begin with a leading case without Mary-
land, which as we later point out, has been cited with
approval by our Maryland Court. This was Dolan v.
Dolan.43  A husband turned over to his wife from time
to time considerable sums of money. She mingled these
sums with sums she received from the sale of dairy prod-
ucts. After deducting household expenses, she purchased
a home in her name, with the husband's consent, in order
to keep peace in the family. They quarreled and sepa-
rated. There was never any agreement between these
parties as to these moneys which were saved. She refused
to recognize his rights and he sued for an accounting, etc.
He was held entitled to this. The opinion of the Court
outlined the applicable principles of law:"
"In the present case, the facts disclosed strongly
indicate that each originally understood that they were
engaging in a joint enterprise, but they had no under-
standing as to the sharing of the results of their joint
action.
"It thus appears that their relation was what at
Common Law was looked upon as a sort of informal
partnership. It would probably still be so considered
in the British Dominion, but in this country it is com-
4"107 Conn. 342, 140 A. 745 (1928).
"Ibid., 107 Conn. 348-9.
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monly defined as a joint enterprise or adventure.
While the distinction between a partnership and a
joint adventure is often slight, it is commonly con-
sidered that, as respects the character of the enter-
prise, a partnership is formed for the purpose of carry-
ing on a general business of one sort or another, and
a joint adventure is more commonly limited to a single
transaction or course of transactions. 33 Corpus Juris,
p. 842. 'To constitute a joint adventure two parties
must combine their property, money, efforts, skill or
knowledge in some common undertaking'. Wilson v.
Maryland, 152 Minn. 506-510, 189 N. W. 437. There
is not the relation of principal and agent in joint ad-
venture which we find in a partnership. Keys v. Hims,
43 Cal. App. 1, 184 Pac. 695.
"Here was a joint fund in the hands of the defendant
wife, placed there with the mutual understanding that
she was to handle it for their mutual advantage, the
first requirement being that she pay the family obli-
gations and there was no express understanding or
agreement beyond this. In a joint adventure it is not
necessary that there be an express agreement, for the
conduct of the parties and other circumstances will
often justify the inference that such an agreement
existed; and the contract is not avoided for indefinite-
ness because the minor details are not fully estab-
lished".
There are many other cases throughout the United
States with analogous facts and similar conclusions. 45
In the case of Atlas Realty Co. v. Galt,46 the Maryland
Court refused to apply the doctrines of joint adventures
to the real estate transaction there involved, and it de-
termined that the relations there presented, involved the
law of principal and agent. But the Court outlined some
15 Wiley v. Wirbelauer, 116 N. J. Eq. 391, 174 A. 20 (1934) ; Clinchfield
Fuel Co. v. Henderson Iron Works, 254 F. 411 (1918) ; In re Kessler and
Co., 174 F. 906 (1909); Leake v. Venice, 50 Cal. App. 462, 195 P. 440(1920) ; All Leong v. Ali Leong, 28 Haw. 581; Gehlhar v. Konoske, 50 N. D.
256, 195 N. W. 558 (1923) ; Dulac Cypress Co. v. Houma Co., 158 La. 804,
104 So. 722 (1925); Hey v. Duncan, 13 F. (2d) 794 (1926) ; Ellingson v.
Amusement Assoc., 175 Minn. 563, 222 N. W. 335 (1928) ; Beierla v. Hock-
enedel, 25 Ohio App. 186, 157 N. E. 573 (1927); Williams v. Riddlesperger,
217 Ala. 62, 114 So. 796 (1927) ; Kent v. Costin, 130 Minn. 450, 153 N. W.
874 (1915).
46 153 Md. 586, 139 A. 285 (1927).
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of the principles of the law of joint adventures, in these
words: 47
"The first and most important question presented
by the record is whether there is in the case any evi-
dence legally sufficient to support the plaintiff's con-
tention. He apparently relies to some extent upon the
theory that Miller and the Company were engaged
in a joint adventure, but there is no evidence in the
case legally sufficient to support that contention. In
a sense they were engaged in a joint adventure, be-
cause each of them expected to profit through the sale
of the same property, but in that sense nearly every
principal and agent, where a sale of real estate is sold
by the agent, are engaged in a joint adventure. But
something more than mere profit sharing is required
to establish the fact that both were engaged in a joint
adventure in the technical sense of that phrase. Nat.
Surety Co. vs. Winslow, 143 Minn. 66; 33 C. J. 847.
While a joint adventure may be distinguished from a
partnership, nevertheless they are both so much alike
that it is often very difficult to differentiate them.
And to establish either it is necessary to do more than
show that the persons said to be so associated are to
share in the profits of a transaction. Clark v. Muir,
298 Ill. 548; Manker v. Tough, 79 Kan. 46; 33 C. J. 844.
But it is essential to show that they have a joint pro-
prietary interest, or that they are to share losses as
well as profits, or that they have a joint control over
the subject matter of the adventure or the manner
in which it is to be carried out. In fine, there seems
to be no 'real distinction between a joint adventure,
and what is termed a partnership for a single trans-
action'. Rowley on Partnership, par. 975."
In a case recently decided by the Maryland Court of
Appeals it was held that a series of transactions in the
nature of loans by one party to the other, was not a joint
adventure.48 The Court said:
"To constitute a 'joint venture', or 'joint adventure',
as it is sometimes called, it is not sufficient that parties
share in profits and losses, but they must intend to
be associated as partners, either as general partners,
47 Ibid., 153 Md. 589.
4s Brenner v. Plitt, 34 A. (2d) 853 (Md., 1943).
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or merely for the duration of the joint adventure.
Hutchinson v. Birdsong, 207 N. Y. S. 273, 275, 211 App.
Div. 316. Mere agreement to share profits, of itself,
constitutes neither a partnership nor a joint adventure.
Palmer v. Maney, 266 P. 424, 428, 45 Idaho 731. It
has been held that a 'joint adventure' exists when two
or more persons combine in joint business enterprise
for their mutual benefit with the understanding that
they are to share in profits or losses and that each is
to have voice in its management. Chisholm v. Gilmer,
C. C. A. Va. 81 F. 2nd 120, 124."
In Powers v. State,49 the Maryland Court in an alleged
tort liability case, decided there was no joint adventure,
but on page 29 the case of Dolan v. Dolan," was cited
with approval, and the general law on the subject was
stated at length. In Kemp v. Kemp,51 the appellant
claimed the benefits of the law of joint adventures in the
transaction there involved; upon an issue of fact, without
mention of any aspect of the law of joint adventures, this
claim was rejected. In Warner v. Markoe,5 2 the Court
decided that when a passenger in an automobile goes on
"a drinking cruise" with the owner of the automobile,
there is no joint adventure so as to charge acts of the
driver ("defendant's employee") to the plaintiff, though
"It is true there was a common purpose in seeking the
pleasure of the two". Since this article was written, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has decided the case of Home
News, Inc., v. Goodman, in which the Court made this
statement, quoted from a current law encyclopedia: 52a
"Where two or more persons are jointly interested
to have certain services performed, they may be pre-
sumed to be jointly obligated unless there is something
to indicate a different intention".
40 178 Md. 23, 11 A. (2d) 909 (1940).
10 107 Conn. 342, 140 A. 745 (1928).
51 178 Md. 645, 16 A. (2d) 888 (1940).
52171 Md. 351, 358-91, 189 A. 260 (1937).
6235 A. (2d) 442 (Md., 1944), quoting 17 C. J. S. 1228-9, Sec. 587.
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IX.
LIABILITIES OF JOINT ADVENTUBERS INTER SE.
53
1. Contract Liability. In cases of express contracts,
where the parties have stipulated their rights, there is no
difficulty except possibly as to the proper remedy and the
forum. We have cited cases above in which, in appropriate
instances, both equity and law courts have been resorted
to. To these might be added the cases in the footnote, in
which Equity has granted affirmative relief in situations
at least analogous to joint adventures.sa
Outside of Maryland, it is generally held that if a joint
adventure is established but without any agreement as
to the division of profits and losses, the division is pre-
sumed to be equal.54
2. Property. Sometimes in a joint adyenture, prop-
erty is acquired in the name of one member who refuses
to appropriate it to the joint cause.55
3. Tort Liability. There have been four cases before
the Maryland Court of Appeals involving tort liability aris-
ing from joint adventures, but in no one of the four cases
did the Court deem that the circumstances amounted to
a joint adventure.56
In Powers v. State, though the Court held that on the
facts there was no joint enterprise, a very full outline of
the applicable joint adventure law was furnished by way
of dictum.57 We shall refer to this case below in connec-
11 The general subject of the rights and liabilities of joint adventurers
inter se is discussed extensively in 33 C. J. 851-71, and 30 Am. Jur. 690-9.
53, Noel v. Noel, 173 Md. 152, 195 A. 315 (1937) ; Bryant v. Fitzsimmons,
106 Md. 421, 67 A. 356 (1907).
54 33 C. J. 861. In Dolan v. Dolan, 107 Conn. 342, 350, 140 A. 745 (1928),
it was said: "Until the contrary is shown, the law will presume that the
parties intended an equal division of the results of their joint efforts, and
the court will enter a decree accordingly." See, in this connection, Berg v.
Plitt, 178 Md. 155, 12 A. (2d) 609 (1940), and 30 Am. Jur. 693.
" The law generally on this subject is well summarized in 33 C. J. 858.
Analogous circumstances are dealt with in Maryland as resulting trusts,
Byer v. Szandrowski, 160 Md. 212, 153 A. 49 (1931) ; Dixon v. Dixon, 123
Md. 44, 90 A. 846 (1914) ; and see 65 C. J. 303-5.
11 Powers v. State, 178 Md. 23, 11 A. (2d) 909 (1940) ; Warner v. Markoe,
171 Md. 351, 189 A. 260 (1937) ; Vacek v. State, 155 Md. 400, 142 A. 491
(1928) ; State v. N. & W. Ry., 151 Md. 679, 135 A. 827 (1926).
57 Supra, 178 Md. 29-31.
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tion with the tort liability affecting third persons. But,
the opinion recited: "
"But the rule (doctrine of imputed negligence in
third party cases) does not apply when one member
of the enterprise brings the action against another
member who owns or operates the vehicle, for the
doctrine of imputed negligence is inapplicable as be-
tween the parties".
The Court then referred to an Arizona case in which
one "joy rider" was allowed to recover from another. The
Arizona Court defines "joy riders" as two or more persons
"enjoying the exhilerating and pleasurable sensations inci-
dent to the swirl and dash of rapid transit".
We take this case to be an affirmation of the postulate
that one member of a joint adventure has a good cause of
action against another member for the latter's personal
negligence. This is undoubtedly the rule asserted by the
great weight of authority outside of Maryland. 9
X.
RIGHTS AND LIABILIrIES OF THiRD PERSONS IN
CONNECTION WITH JOINT ADVENTuRS.
1. Contract Cases. In cases of Joint Adventures cre-
ated by express contracts, when all contingencies are pro-
vided for, there will be no difficulties encountered. But
in those instances which we class as growing out of im-
plied contracts, there will be many situations in which
the solution will be troublesome; and the problems will
be mostly about agency questions."'
There are no Maryland decisions in point, and the only
light we can throw on this phase of our subject is to out-
line some general agency principles from which a start
can be made when specific instances are to be considered.
58 Ibid., 31.
go McCombs v. Ellsberry, 337 Mo. 491, 85 S. W. (2d) 135 (1935) ; Note,
The Concept of "Joint Enterprise" in Automobile Injury Cases (1941) 26
Marq. L. Rev. 33; Note, The Doctrine of Joint Enterprise (1940) 14 Temp.
L. Q. 535; Note, Automobiles-Negligence--Joint Enterprise (1936) 20
Minn. L. Rev. 401. In this last article some authorities are cited which
are not in accord with the prevailing rule.
60 This general topic is dealt with in 33 C. J. 871-74, 30 Am. Jur. 699-700.
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The general principles of Partnership and Agency Law
are definitely outlined in the Maryland law; they have
been expressed by judicial decisions, and crystallized in
statute by the Uniform Partnership Law. Each member
of a partnership is an authorized agent for other members
to the extent of the business of the partnership. 1 In adapt-
ing these principles to Joint Adventures, the authorities
express gradations of views amounting almost to conflict.
Our Court of Appeals has expressed the general view that
Partnerships and Joint Adventures are essentially the same
thing.62 A leading authority without Maryland says:
"There is not the relation of principal and agent in joint
adventure which we find in a partnership". 3
In discussing this subject, a learned annotator writing
in the Harvard Law Review, says that in a partnership,
each member is a co-owner of the business, and there
mutual agency is "an established necessary ingredient".
But in the case of a joint adventure, there is not the same
co-ownership of a business. There is no distinct entity.
Hence the question of agency is one of authority by agree-
ment, express or implied.6 4
Perhaps the best statement is that a member of a joint
adventure can bind his associates as to the business of
the joint adventure in connection with such contracts as
are reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the
enterprise.65 While it is only remotely connected with
the subject, we might call attention to the thought that
in connection with corporate agency questions, our Court
of Appeals often inclines to the view that corporate agents
have limited powers.60
On the whole, the best general observation we can
make is that in each case there will probably be some
circumstances in the transaction being examined which
will define the authority of individual members of the
"
1 Bradford v. Harford Bank, 148 Md. 1, 22-3, 128 A. 899 (1925) ; Maltby
v. R. R. Co., 16 Md. 422 (1860) ; Md. Code (1939) Art. 73A, Sec. 9.
"2 Atlas Realty Co. v. Gait, 153 Md. 586, 139 A. 285 (1927).
68 Dolan v. Doland, 107 Conn. 342, 140 A. 745 (1928).
"
4 Note, 8upra, n. 1, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 854.
e 33 C. J. 871; 30 Am. Jur. 699.
Kennedy v. Insurance Co., 162 Md. 340, 159 A. 780 (1932) ; Liggett v.
Rose, 152 Md. 146, 136 A. 651 (1927).
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enterprise, to bind the other participants. In brief, each
case depends on its own particular facts.
2. Tort Cases. We have cited above the four Mary-
land decisions, in which in tort cases the issue of joint
adventure was raised. In one of these cases the issue was
between members of the alleged joint enterprise. In the
other three cases, the issue was between a passenger in
the automobile and a third party claimed to be responsible
for the accident. In them an effort was made to charge
the alleged negligence of the owner of the car against
the plaintiff, upon the ground that the plaintiff and the
owner of the car were engaged in a joint adventure and
hence the negligence of the driver (whether the owner
of the car or his chauffeur) is chargeable to the plaintiff
who is thus debarred of recovery by reason of the imputed
contributory negligence.
The Court decided that none of these cases was a joint
adventure, but, in Powers v. State,17 the prevailing opinion
outlined at considerable length the essentials and con-
sequences of a joint adventure in automobile accident
cases. Three judges concurred in the majority opinion;
two dissented.
The general requisites of a Joint Adventure are out-
lined in the opinion: 68
"The question whether occupants of an automobile
were engaged in a joint enterprise is often a question
for the jury (citing a Kansas case). It is generally
held that the common purpose of riding together for
pleasure is insufficient to establish a joint enterprise.
Although the purpose of a pleasure journey is a com-
mon one, the courts usually hold that such a purpose
is not sufficiently joint to have the effect of imputing
the negligence of the driver to the others, unless the
parties had entered into an actual or implied contract
giving common possession of the vehicle and joint con-
trol of its operation".
67 178 Md. 23, 11 A. (2d) 909 (1940) ; noted with criticism of the con-
clusion in Note, Auto Owner s Liability for Injury Caused by Guest Per-
mitted to Drive (1940) 5 Md. L. Rev. 104.
. 68 Ibid., 178 Md. 29.
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And, further, the Court said that the doctrine of im-
puted negligence would not apply in that suit, which was
not one between alleged joint adventurers, but then on the
same page the opinion stated the law applicable under
the present topic: 9
"The general rule is that where the occupants of
a vehicle are engaged in a joint enterprise, the negli-
gence of one member of the enterprise will be imputed
to another when the action is brought against a third
party".
XI.
CONCLUSION.
In the case of Beardsley v. Beardsley,7 0 the Supreme
Court looked through stock registration and corporate
form to adjudicate individual rights of brothers in an
adventure which the Court defined as one in which the
two brothers were "joint owners in a common enterprise".
The Court said the exact form of the transaction was not
important, nor the name they chose to give it. "It is the
legal effect of the whole which is sought for".
This decision reveals a common sense view of this
whole subject. The merits of the particular transaction
will probably indicate some appropriate disposition of the
rights of the parties to the joint transaction. While the
remedy applied may be derived as well from the law of
Partnership, or Agency, or Torts, as from Joint Adventures,
this latter title is a convenient one under which to classify
litigation, which in strictness does not belong to the other
longer established subjects, from which the applicable
principles may be borrowed.
So, after all, we might conclude with those familiar
lines in Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet:
"What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet".
09 Ibid., 31.
70 138 U. S. 262 (1891).
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